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Abstract: To ensure the privacy of users in transport
systems, researchers are working on new protocols pro-
viding the best security guarantees while respecting
functional requirements of transport operators. In this
paper1 , we design a secure NFC m-ticketing protocol
for public transport that preserves users’ anonymity
and prevents transport operators from tracing their cus-
tomers’ trips. To this end, we introduce a new practi-
cal set-membership proof that does not require provers
nor verifiers (but in a specific scenario for verifiers) to
perform pairing computations. It is therefore particu-
larly suitable for our (ticketing) setting where provers
hold SIM/UICC cards that do not support such costly
computations. We also propose several optimizations of
Boneh-Boyen type signature schemes, which are of inde-
pendent interest, increasing their performance and effi-
ciency during NFC transactions. Our m-ticketing proto-
col offers greater flexibility compared to previous solu-
tions as it enables the post-payment and the off-line val-
idation of m-tickets. By implementing a prototype using
a standard NFC SIM card, we show that it fulfils the
stringent functional requirement imposed by transport
operators whilst using strong security parameters. In
particular, a validation can be completed in 184.25ms
when the mobile is switched on, and in 266.52ms when
the mobile is switched off or its battery is flat.
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m-ticketing, privacy, anonymity, unlinkability, post-
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1 Introduction
Near Field Communication (NFC) [36] is a highly-
practical emerging technology [27]. Indeed, NFC-
enabled smartphones are being used in several domains,
such as payment [47], access control [19] and ticket-
ing [16]. In the following, we focus on mobile ticketing
for public transport. Such a ticketing system is oper-
ated by a transport authority representing the trans-
port service provider, and it usually consists of three
phases [39]. First, the user registers (Registration). Sec-
ondly, the user obtains the product (a set of m-tickets)
to be used (Provisioning). The last phase is the Val-
idation, during which an m-ticket is validated by the
transport authority using the NFC connection of a mo-
bile phone. During this phase, the m-ticketing system
must ensure the integrity and authenticity of the m-
ticket. Another important aspect is that a network con-
nection [15] is sometimes required, either for the val-
idator gate or for the smartphone itself. Moreover, the
validation is subject to a hard time constraint imposed
by the transport operators [32]: the m-ticket validation
must occur in less than 300 ms.
In the literature, many proposed solutions did not
consider the security aspects. Even when security is-
sues are addressed, the concept of user’s privacy, that
is users’ anonymity and users’ trips unlinkability with
respect to the transport service provider, is often over-
looked [22, 49]. Some recent works [16, 44] have shown
a special interest in users’ privacy. Although they man-
aged to ensure user’s anonymity, these solutions suffer
from privacy weaknesses.
In this paper, we propose a new cryptographic pro-
tocol for m-ticketing that provides strong authentica-
tion, anonymity, and unlinkability properties, whilst re-
maining efficient when implemented in constrained en-
vironments such as SIM cards.
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Towards this goal, we also make various crypto-
graphic optimizations. In particular, we present a new
efficient set-membership proof enabling a prover to
prove, in a zero-knowledge way, that his secret belongs
to a given public set. Unlike previous constructions, this
proof does not require pairing computations, especially
on the prover side, which are quite costly, in the or-
der of seconds, e.g. for the following microprocessors:
17.9s on an ATmega [48], 2.5s on a Philips HiPerS-
mart™MIPS [18], 1.9s on an MSP430X [31]. We also
propose several optimizations of Boneh-Boyen signa-
ture schemes. These results are of independent inter-
est and increase the performance and efficiency of BB-
signatures.
Based on these cryptographic primitives, our m-
ticketing protocol enables to securely validate an m-
ticket without disclosing any personal information to
the transport operator, even if the latter is malicious.
We push forward a strict privacy requirement when us-
ing one of the numbered m-tickets: for example, if the
user uses the m-ticket number 3 from the set [1..10], the
transport operator will only be able to check that the
used m-ticket is one among the ten m-tickets [1..10].
We implemented our system on a standard NFC
SIM card. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first implementation of efficient and practical set-
membership proofs and BB-signatures on SIM cards.
The entire validation process can be performed without
any connection to a back-end server or computations
delegation to the smartphone hosting the SIM card.
This avoids any tracking of the user by a malware in-
stalled in the smartphone. We also show that the valida-
tion process occurs, on average, in 184.25ms when the
mobile is switched on and in 266.52ms when the mo-
bile is switched off or its battery is flat (battery-Off).
Moreover, we show that our protocol supports the post
payment approach (which provides more flexibility) and
give countermeasures to detect any misuse of the service
owing to the regular reports of unused m-tickets.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses related work on privacy-preserving m-ticketing
schemes. In Section 3, we detail the framework of our m-
ticketing protocol. Then, we introduce in Section 4 our
assumptions and the desired security, privacy and func-
tional requirements that an m-ticketing system should
fulfil. In Section 5, we describe the cryptographic as-
sumptions and building blocks required for the sequel.
We introduce our new set-membership proof in Section 6
and our m-ticketing protocol in Section 7. Section 8
gives the security proofs. In Section 9, we present our
implementation before concluding in Section 10.
2 Related work
Heydt-Benjamin et al. were the first to propose a cryp-
tographic framework for transport service [33]. They
discuss the challenges that a privacy-preserving transit
system should solve. Using cryptographic transit tickets
should not disable basic capabilities like cloning detec-
tion, virtual ticket backups or transfers, ticket revoca-
tion. The efficiency of the use of a virtual ticket, espe-
cially over the air, is also important. Later, many ap-
plied m-ticketing solutions have been proposed [5, 16,
22, 35, 44, 45, 49]. However, each proposal has some
limitations that this paper tries to solve. We briefly de-
scribe these limitations in this section.
First, the RSA based m-ticketing solution proposed
by Ekberg and Tamrakar [22, 49], the RFID e-tickets
proposed by Sadeghi et al. [45] and the ticketing so-
lution proposed by Blass et al. [5] only protect user’s
privacy with respect to outsiders and not the transport
authority. The transport authority is considered honest
which is not anymore a reasonable hypothesis.
Second, the most recent protocols that include the
expected level of privacy by protecting users’ privacy
even against the transport authority still have some ef-
ficiency problems. For instance, the BBS based protocol
proposed by Isern-Deya et al. [35] validates a ticket with
a duration of few seconds, even if the implementation
has been done on a smartphone. Some recent solutions
were close to find the right balance between efficiency
and users’ privacy. Derler et al. proposal [16] provides
anonymous tickets but users’ trips are still linkable.
Rupp et al. proposal [44] provides a privacy preserving
pre-payment protocol with refund for public transport
with a refund verification procedure with a too high
cost for constrained devices. Removing this verification
makes possible to use the protocol, but it also enables
a malicious transport authority to link users’ trips, as
detailed in Appendix A.
Our m-ticketing protocol tries to fill the remaining
gap between efficiency and strong privacy. It can be used
in very constrained devices, like SIM cards and offers a
high level of privacy.
3 Framework of the protocol
In privacy-preserving m-ticketing system, we consider
three different entities. The user (U) is the owner of an
NFC-enabled smartphone and wants to use the trans-
port service. The transport authority (TA) is the man-
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ager of the transport service. Additionally, we consider
a third actor which is a revocation authority (RA). It
can revoke m-tickets and users’ anonymity, and is com-
pletely independent of the transport authority. This role
may be split between several authorities in such a way
that they should all agree and cooperate before recov-
ering the identity of an m-ticket holder.
An m-ticketing system consists of six different
phases in our protocol. (1) The m-ticketing system pa-
rameters and keys are initialized during the initializa-
tion. (2) The registration phase enables a user to regis-
ter to the transport service. (3) In the permission token
request phase, a user gets a permission token allowing
him to generate maxticket m-tickets. (4) The validation
phase consists in generating and validating an m-ticket.
(5) The revocation phase enables to retrieve the iden-
tity of a user who generated a given m-ticket and the
m-tickets obtained by a given user. Finally, (6) the re-
porting phase enables a user to report his usage (i.e.
the m-tickets that he did not use) to the transport au-
thority that can detect any duplication of m-tickets (i.e.
m-tickets that have been validated several times). In
the sequel, these phases are modeled with various algo-
rithms and protocols executed by the above entities.
Initialization.
Setup(1λ): This probabilistic algorithm outputs pp
a description of the system parameters. We assume that
pp are implicit to the other algorithms, and that they
include λ, the security parameter, and maxticket, the
number of m-tickets that each book/set of m-tickets
contains. They are also an implicit input to the adver-
sary, we will then omit them.
Keygen(pp): This probabilistic algorithm outputs
the two following secret/public key pairs: (rsk, rpk) for
the revocation authority and (tsk, tpk) for the transport
authority. The system public key gpk is eventually set
as (pp, tpk, rpk).
Registration.
UKeygen(gpk, IDU ): This probabilistic algorithm
outputs a secret/public key pair (usk, upk) for a user
identifier IDU .
Register(U(IDU , upk), TA(DBREG)): This is an in-
teractive protocol between a new user that takes as in-
put his identity IDU and his public key upk, and the
TA that takes as input the database DBREG where the
identifiers of the registered users will be stored. If TA
accepts the protocol, the user’s identity and public key
are stored within DBREG.
Permission token request.
TokenRequest(U(upk, gpk), TA(tsk, gpk,DBREG)):
This is an interactive protocol between a user that
takes as input (upk, gpk), and the TA that takes as in-
put (tsk, gpk,DBREG). If the user accepts the protocol,
his output is a permission token τ that will enable him
to generate/validate a set of maxticket m-tickets. If TA
accepts the protocol, its output is a transcript view of
the protocol.
Validation.
GenTicket(gpk, τ): This probabilistic algorithm
takes as input a user’s permission token τ and outputs
an m-ticket T ickk with a serial number Bk such that
k ∈ [1..maxticket].
ValidateTicket(gpk, T ickk): This deterministic al-
gorithm takes as input a ticket T ickk. If T ickk is valid,
it outputs 1 (otherwise 0) and T ickk is stored within
the database DBUsedTickets that will be used to detect
the m-tickets that have been used several times.
Revocation.
IdentUser(rsk, DBREG, Tickk): This deterministic
algorithm takes as input the private key rsk, the
database DBREG and a valid m-ticket T ickk. It out-
puts the identifier IDU of the user who obtained T ickk.
If IDU does not belong to DBREG, it outputs ⊥.
IdentTicket(rsk, view, IDU ): This deterministic al-
gorithm takes as input the private key rsk, a user’s
identifier IDU and a transcript view of an execution
of TokenRequest with this user. It outputs all the m-
tickets that can be generated from the token obtained
after the execution of the TokenRequest protocol that
led to view.
Reporting.
ReportTicket(τ): This algorithm is executed by a
user with his permission token τ . The user generates all
the unused m-tickets and collects them in a usage report
R. R is then sent to the transport authority.
IdentDuplicate(Bk, DBUsedTickets): This determin-
istic algorithm takes as input Bk the serial number of
a valid m-ticket T ickk and DBUsedTickets, and outputs
the number of occurrences of Bk in DBUsedTickets.
4 Requirements
In this section, we first describe our trust assumptions.
Then, we detail the requirements of our m-ticketing sys-
tem. We consider two types of requirements, functional
requirements, which are “efficiency” and “versatility”
and security and privacy requirements, which consist
in “correctness”, “unforgeability”, “unlinkability” and
“non-frameability”.
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4.1 Trust assumptions
At the user’s side, we consider an untrusted mobile plat-
form (smartphone) with an incorporated trusted secure
element. We use a SIM card as a tamper resistant se-
cure element since it could be certified EAL4+ [24].
Using a SIM card will ensure the integrity of the im-
plementation. Indeed, the m-ticketing cardlet manages
the cryptographic credentials of the m-ticketing applica-
tion and executes required cryptographic computations
without delegating any of them to the smartphone. Con-
sequently, if the mobile application is compromised, the
security will not be impacted because all the sensitive
data and credentials are stored and managed in the SIM
card. If the SIM card gets compromised, we planned
countermeasures (cf. Section 7.4.2).
4.2 Functional requirements
4.2.1 Efficiency
M-ticketing systems must fulfil functional requirements
imposed by transport operators [32], in particular the
validation of an m-ticket must be performed in less than
300ms. We must consider that a SIM card has limited
computation capabilities. In particular, pairing APIs are
not available on current SIM cards.
4.2.2 Versatility
The mobile phone and the validator cannot be assumed
to be connected to a back-end server during the vali-
dation phase. This enables the user to use an m-ticket
in any kind of situation, especially in areas with low
connectivity, e.g., underground, or if the battery of his
mobile is flat. Moreover, the m-ticketing system must
support the post-payment mode, i.e., charged later (af-
ter its use).
4.3 Security and privacy model
Besides the correctness property2 (which is obvious),
we formally define three security and privacy properties
2 Informally speaking, our protocol is correct if (1) a valid permis-
sion token enables to generate valid m-tickets, (2) honestly generated
m-tickets are accepted, (3) a validated m-ticket enables revocation
authorities to identify the user who generated it and (4) revoca-
tion authorities can retrieve all the m-tickets generated by a given
registered user that obtained a valid permission token.
of our m-ticketing protocol in which the attack capabil-
ities of a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A are
modeled by providing him access to some oracles. In the
sequel, HU will denote the set of honest users andMU
the set of corrupted users. We assume that A receives
all the exchanged messages in our system. A acts as an
active adversary as regards to the messages issued by
malicious users and as a passive adversary with respect
to honest users.
ORegisterHU is an oracle that will be used by
an adversary in order to register honest users. By
calling this oracle with IDU as argument, the adver-
sary adds a new user. The oracle runs (upk, usk) ←
UKeygen(gpk, IDU ) and adds IDU (along with upk) to
the set HU . The private key usk is kept secret and pub-
lic key upk is returned to the adversary.
ORegisterMU is an oracle that will be used by an
adversary in order to register malicious users. The ad-
versary calls this oracle with argument the identifier
IDU of a user and sets his public key to upk and his
private key to usk. The identity IDU (along with upk)
is added to the setMU .
OCorruptUser is a user secret key oracle enabling
the adversary to obtain the private key usk of a user
IDU ∈ HU . The oracle transfers IDU to MU and re-
turns usk.
OTokenRequestU is an oracle that runs the user’s
side in the TokenRequest protocol. This oracle will be
used by an adversary playing the role of a malicious TA.
The adversary gives to the oracle an identity IDU of an
honest user and his public key upk. The adversary is
then given a transcript view of the protocol.
OTokenRequestT is an oracle that runs the trans-
port authority side in the TokenRequest protocol. This
oracle will be used to simulate the execution of the pro-
tocol between a user (corrupted or not) and an honest
TA.
OGenTicket(IDU , view) is an oracle that takes as
input the identifier IDU of an honest user and a tran-
script view of an execution of the TokenRequest proto-
col with this user and outputs an m-ticket T ickk using a
fresh index k that has not been used in a previous query
of OGenTicket on IDU and view. The oracle records
(IDU , T ickk) in a list Set.
OIdentT icketT (IDU , view) is an oracle that takes
as input the identifier of a user IDU and a transcript
view of an execution of TokenRequest with this user
and outputs all the m-tickets that this user is able to
generate.
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ExpNfraA (1λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅; Set← ∅.
2. (gpk, tsk, rsk)← Keygen(pp).
3. (T ickk) ← A(gpk, tsk, rsk, DBREG, DBUsedTickets:
ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OTokenRequestU , OGenTicket, OReportT icket).
4. If ValidateTicket(gpk, T ickk) = 0 or IdentUser(rsk,
DBREG, T ickk) =⊥ then return 0.
5. If IdentUser(rsk,DBREG, T ickk) = IDU ∈ HU and
(IDU , T ickk) /∈ Set then return 1 else return 0.
Fig. 1. Non-frameability security experiment
OIdentUserT (T ickk) is an oracle that returns the
identifier IDU of the user who generated an m-ticket
T ickk.
OReportT icket(IDU , view) is an oracle that takes
as input the identifier IDU of an honest user and a tran-
script view of a TokenRequest execution with this user
and outputs the set of unused m-tickets. For each un-
used m-ticket T ickk, the oracle records (IDU , T ickk) in
Set.
In the sequel, we denote by A(keys, DB: oracles) an
adversary who receives the keys “keys”. This adversary
has only read access to the databases “DB” and can
query the oracles “oracles”.
4.3.1 Non-frameability
Informally speaking, it should be impossible for any-
one to falsely accuse an honest user of having spent an
m-ticket. We formally define the non-frameability ex-
periment ExpNfraA (1
λ) in Figure 1. The scheme is non-
frameable, if for any probabilistic polynomial time ad-
versary A, the probability
Pr[ExpNfraA (1
λ)=1] is negligible.
4.3.2 Unforgeability
Informally speaking, it should be impossible for any-
one (1) to validate more m-tickets than what he ob-
tained i.e. an adversary who retrieved N tokens τ (N
sets of maxticket m-tickets) should not be able to gen-
erate more that N ∗ maxticket m-tickets; (2) to vali-
date m-tickets such that the algorithm IdentUser re-
turns ⊥, i.e., an identifier IDU that doesn’t appear in
DBREG. We formally define the unforgeability experi-
ment ExpunforgA (1
λ) in Figure 2. The scheme is unforge-
ExpunforgA (1λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅.
2. (gpk, tsk, rsk)← Keygen(pp).
3. ({T ickj
kj
}j=lj=1, {Ri}i=fi=1 ) ← A(gpk: ORegisterHU ,
ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser, OTokenRequestT ,
OGenTicket, OReportT icket). An Ri corresponds to a
“usage report”, i.e. a set of unused m-tickets.
4. Let DB be an empty database.
5. For j from 1 to l do {If ValidateTicket(gpk, T ickj
kj
) then
store T ickj
kj
in DB}.
6. For i from 1 to f do {Validate the m-tickets of the report
Ri and store valid unused m-tickets in DB}.
7. For all T ickk in DB do {b = IdentDuplicate(Bk, DB)
where Bk is the serial number of the m-ticket T ickk
If b>1, then delete all the duplicates of the m-ticket T ickk.
If IdentUser(rsk,DBREG, T ickk) outputs ⊥ then return 1
and aborts.}.
8. If L, the number of m-tickets that remained within DB, is
greater that N ∗maxticket (L > N ∗maxticket) where N
is the number of calls of the oracle OTokenRequestT and
maxticket is the number of authorized m-tickets by token,
then return 1 else return 0.
Fig. 2. Unforgeability security experiment
able if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary
A, the probability Pr[ExpunforgA (1λ) = 1] is negligible.
4.3.3 Unlinkability
Informally speaking, it should be impossible, except for
the revocation authorities, to trace the m-tickets ob-
tained by a user, in particular: (1) to link m-tickets
obtained during the permission token request phase to
the validated/used ones; (2) to link two m-tickets val-
idated by the same user or to decide whether two val-
idated m-tickets have the same number/index or not;
(3) to link validated m-tickets to non-used m-tickets re-
ported by the user to the transport authority. For this,
an adversary has full control over the transport author-
ity (in particular it owns the private key tsk) and all the
users except two honest users i0 and i1. The adversary
can initiate the IdentUser protocol over any m-ticket
and can get the user’s identity behind it, except for
the m-tickets generated by i0 and i1. He can also ini-
tiate the IdentTicket protocol for all the users except
for i0 and i1. We define the unlinkability experiment
ExpunlinkA (1λ) in Figure 3. The scheme is unlinkable if
for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the
advantage Advunlink−bA (1
λ) = |Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ) =
b]− 1/2| is negligible.
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Expunlink−bA (1λ)
1. pp← Setup(1λ); HU ← ∅; MU ← ∅.
2. (gpk, tsk, rsk)← Keygen(pp).
3. (i0, k0, i1, k1) ← A(gpk, tsk, DBREG, DBUsedTickets:
ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OTokenRequestU , OGenTicket, OIdentT icketT ,
OIdentUserT , OReportT icket).
4. If i0 ∈MU or i1 ∈MU then output ⊥.
5. (a) let i0 and i1 run the protocol TokenRequest and get
the permission tokens τ0 and τ1 and output view0 and
view1.
(b) T ickkb ← GenTicket(gpk, τ0) and
T ickk1−b ← GenTicket(gpk, τ1), with b ∈ {0, 1}.
6. b′ ← A(gpk, tsk, DBREG, DBUsedTickets, T ickkj ,
T ickk1−j : ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OTokenRequestT , OGenTicket, OIdentT icketT ,
OIdentUserT , OReport T icket), with j ∈ {0, 1}.
7. If OCorruptUser was requested on i0 or i1, or
OIdentT icketT was requested on (i0, view0) or (i1, view1)
then output ⊥.
8. If OIdentUserT was requested for T ickkj or T ickk1−j , out-
put ⊥.
9. If OReportT icket was requested for i0 or i1 and i0 and i1
did not validate the same number of m-tickets then output
⊥.
10. Return b′.
Fig. 3. Unlinkability security experiment
Remark: another basic requirement that our tick-
eting system should fulfill is the traceability meaning
that revocation should succeed in the face of attacks
by malicious users. In fact, our formulations of unforge-
ability and non-frameability capture this requirement.
Indeed, an attacker who could produce a ticket which
either (1) cannot be traced to a user or (2) identify
an honest user who didn’t obtain this ticket, would ei-
ther break the unforgeability requirement (1) or the non-
frameability requirement (2).
5 Cryptographic assumptions and
building blocks
In this section, we introduce the notations, definitions
and cryptographic tools used in the description of our
set-membership proof and m-ticketing protocol.
5.1 Bilinear Maps
We consider throughout this document, except when it
is explicitly mentioned, bilinear maps e : G1×G2 → GT
where all groups G1, G2 and GT are multiplicative and
of prime order p. The mapping e satisfies the following
properties:
∀g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab
For g1 6= 1G1 and g2 6= 1G2 , e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT
e is efficiently computable.
5.2 Computational assumptions
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH). For any multi-
plicative group G of prime order p, the DDH assumption
states that given a random generator g ∈ G, two ran-
dom elements ga, gb in G, and a candidate X ∈ G, it is
hard to decide whether X = gab or not.
eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH). Given three
groups G1, G2, GT , and a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 →
GT , the XDH assumption states that DDH assumption
holds in G1.
q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH). The q-SDH
assumption holds for some group G1 if it is hard,
given (g, gy, gy
2
, ... , gy
q
) ∈ Gq+11 , to output a pair
(x, g1/(y+x)).
q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-
DDHI). In any multiplicative group G of prime order
p, the q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption
states that, given a random generator g ∈ G and the
values (g, gα, gα
2
, ... , gα
q
) ∈ G, for a random α ∈ Zp
and a candidate X ∈ G, it is hard to decide whether
X = g1/α or not.
The Decisional Composite Residuosity As-
sumption. There is no probabilistic polynomial time
distinguisher for n-th residues modulo n2. In other
words, there is no probabilistic polynomial time adver-
sary that can distinguish S from Z∗n2 , where S = {z ∈
Z∗n2 , ∃y ∈ Z∗n2 : z = ynmod n2}.
5.3 Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
Roughly speaking, a zero knowledge proof of knowl-
edge, denoted ZKPK, is an interactive protocol during
which a prover convinces a verifier that he knows a set
of secret values (α1, α2, ... , αn) verifying a given rela-
tion < without revealing anything else. Such a proof
will be denoted in the sequel POK((α1, α2, ... , αn) :
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<(α1, α2, ... , αn)). A ZKPK should be complete (a
valid prover is accepted with overwhelming probabil-
ity), sound (a false prover should be rejected with over-
whelming probability) and zero-knowledge (no in-
formation about the secret is revealed). These ZKPK
can be made non-interactive using the generic trans-
formation introduced by Fiat and Shamir [25]. The re-
sulting non-interactive proofs, sometimes called signa-
tures of knowledge [11], can be proven secure in the
random oracle model of [3] (see [42]). Such a signa-
ture of knowledge, for the relation <, will be denoted
SOK((α1, α2, ... , αn) : <(α1, α2, ... , αn)) .
5.4 Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures
These signatures, proposed by Camesnich and Lysyan-
skaya [10], are equipped with additional protocols. One
of these protocols allows a signature to be issued on mes-
sages that are not known by the signer, but for which the
signer only knows a commitment. Informally, in a proto-
col for signing a committed value, we have a signer with
public key pk, and the corresponding secret key sk, and
a user who queries the signer for a signature. The com-
mon input to the protocol is a commitment C, known
by both parties, on secret values (x1, x2, ... , xn) known
only by the user. At the end of this protocol, the user
obtains a valid CL − signature = Sign(x1, x2, ... , xn)
and the signer learns nothing about (x1, x2, ... , xn).
Another protocol allows to prove knowledge of a sig-
nature on a tuple of messages (x1, x2, ... , xn) without re-
leasing any information on the corresponding signature.
Each message can either be revealed to the verifier, sent
in a committed form, or it may be such that the verifier
has no information on it. In particular, it is possible to
prove the knowledge of a CL-signature on committed
values.
5.5 Set Membership Proofs
A set membership proof allows a prover to prove, in a
zero-knowledge way, that his secret lies in a given pub-
lic set. Such proofs can be used, for instance, in the
context of electronic voting, where the voter needs to
prove that his secret vote belongs to the set of all possi-
ble candidates. Recent propositions of set membership
proofs [12, 13] follow the same idea: a designated au-
thority produces public signatures on each element of
the public set Φ (and only on these elements). The proof
of knowledge of a secret x ∈ Φ consists in proving the
knowledge of a (public) signature on the secret x (which
will be only possible if x belongs to the set Φ) without
revealing x or the used signature. Solutions in [12, 13] re-
quire the prover to perform pairing computations. How-
ever, these cryptographic tools are not often convenient
for many constrained platforms.
5.6 Boneh-Boyen Signatures
The signature scheme used by the designated authority
(which could be the verifier) to sign each element of the
set Φ is the one proposed by Boneh and Boyen [6–8].
Based on their scheme, which is secure under the q-
SDH assumption, it is possible to prove knowledge of a
signature on a message, without revealing the signature
nor the message.
5.6.1 Boneh-Boyen Signatures with pairings.
Having a secret key y and two random generators g1, g2
of G1, the signature of a message m ∈ Zp is obtained by
computing σ = g1/(y+m)1 . Given a bilinear pairing e, a
signature σ of m is valid if e(σ, Y gm2 ) = e(g1, g2), where
Y = gy2 is the signer’s public key.
5.6.2 Boneh-Boyen Signatures without pairings.
Let G be a cyclic group with prime order p where the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is assumed
to be hard and g1, g2 two random generators of G. The
signer’s private key is y ∈ Zp and its public key is Y =
gy2 .
Similarly to Boneh-Boyen signatures with pairings,
the signature on a message m is the value A = g1/(y+m)1 .
This implies that Ay = g1A−m. Since we work in a group
G not equipped with a bilinear map, the signer must ad-
ditionally prove that the signature on m is valid, which
is done by generating a ZKPK pi that the discrete loga-
rithm of (g1A−m) in the base A is equal to the discrete
logarithm of Y in the base g2: SOK(y : Y = gy2 ∧Ay =
g1A
−m). Such a proof of equality of discrete logarithms
has been introduced in [14]. Finally, the signature A on
m is valid if the proof pi is valid.
Theorem 1. The Boneh-Boyen (BB for short) sig-
nature scheme without pairings is existentially unforge-
able under a weak chosen message attack under the q-
Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the random oracle
model.
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Proof (sketch). Under the q-Strong Diffie-
Hellman assumption, it is impossible to find a message
m (which was not given to the signing oracle) and a
value A such that A = g1/(y+m)1 , as proved in [6, 7].
Moreover, in the random oracle model, the proof of
knowledge pi is unforgeable [6, 7], which concludes the
proof.
5.7 Threshold Cryptosystems
The El Gamal cryptosystem [23] works as follows. Let
G be a cyclic group with prime order p where the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is assumed
to be hard. The public key consists of the elements
(gT , hT = gxTT ), where gT is a random generator of G,
and the corresponding private key is formed by xT ∈ Z∗p.
The El Gamal ciphertext of a message m ∈ G is (C1 =
grT , C2 = m × hrT ), where r ∈ Z∗p is a random number.
The decryption of the ciphertext (C1, C2) is obtained
through the following computation: m = C2/CxT1 . The
El Gamal cryptosystem is semantically secure under the
DDH assumption.
The Paillier cryptosystem [40] works as follows. Let
a and b be random primes for which a, b > 2, a 6=
b, |a| = |b| and gcd(ab, (a − 1)(b − 1)) = 1. Let n = ab,
Π = lcm(a−1, b−1),K = Π−1 mod n, and gP = (1+n).
The public key is pk = (n, gP ) and the secret key is
sk = (a, b). To encrypt m ∈ Zn, the user chooses r ∈ Z∗n
and C = EncryptPaipk(m, r) = gmP rn mod n2. The
decryption algorithm is given by DecryptPaisk(C) =
((CΠKmod n2) − 1)/n mod n2 = m. The Paillier
cryptosystem is secure under the Decisional Composite
Residuosity assumption3 .
In a threshold version, the El Gamal public key and
its corresponding private key [17] (resp. the Paillier pub-
lic key and its corresponding private key [26]) are coop-
eratively generated by n parties; however, the private
key is shared among the parties. In order to decrypt a
ciphertext, a minimal number of t (the threshold) out
of n parties is necessary.
3 We use Paillier encryption scheme in our system in order to satisfy
the unforgeability requirement even in a concurrent setting, where
the adversary is allowed to interact with the transport authority,
during the permission token request phase, in an arbitrarily inter-
leaving (concurrent) manner (see [34]).
5.8 Pseudo-random Function
A useful building block of our m-ticketing protocol is the
pseudo-random function introduced by Dodis and Yam-
polskiy [20, 21]. Their construction works as follows. Let
G be a cyclic group with prime order p, gt a generator of
G, s ∈ Zp a private secret. The pseudo-random function
(PRF for short) Fs takes as input a message k ∈ Zp and
outputs Fs(k) = g1/(s+k+1)t . This construction is secure
under the q-DDHI assumption in G.
6 A new set membership proof
In this section, we present a new set membership pro-
tocol. Our set membership proof is a ZKPK which al-
lows the prover to convince any verifier that the com-
mitted integer k lies in the public discrete set Φ. This
ZKPK can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic and the random oracle model [25]. The
commitment scheme that we use is the one proposed by
Pedersen [41].
Our set membership proof bears some similarities
with the protocol proposed by Camenisch et al. [9].
Yet, our set membership proof does not ask the prover
(a SIM card and/or a smartphone in our setting) nor
the verifier (in a specific scenario) to perform pairing
computations. Our set membership proof is also more
efficient and conceptually simpler than the recent one
proposed by Canard et al. at EuroPKI 2013 [12]. Their
scheme which involves several verifiers, who share a de-
cryption key, seems to be tailored to specific applica-
tions such as e-voting where the verifiers (tallying au-
thorities) own such a key to open ballots.
Let G1, G2 and GT be three (multiplicative) bi-
linear groups of prime order p and a bilinear map
e : G1 × G2 → GT . Let g, g1 and hT be three gener-
ators of G1 and consider a generator g3 of G2. A des-
ignated authority (which may or may not be the veri-
fier) randomly chooses a value y ∈ Z∗p (its private key)
and publishes the corresponding public key Y = gy3 .
After generating its key, this designated authority can
issue BB-signatures on each element of the public set Φ.
Let k denote an element of the set Φ and Ak the BB-
signature on the value k, i.e., Ak = g1/(y+k). The set
of all message-signature pairs (k,Ak), that we denote
by
∑
, is published by the designated authority. H will
denote a hash function, for instance, SHA-256.
In Figure 4, we propose a protocol enabling to prove
that the value k committed by the prover in the com-
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Prover Verifier
Public input: public parameters, sets Φ and
∑
Public Input: public parameters, sets Φ and
∑
Private Input: k Private Input: y
Pre-computations:
Choose ν ∈ Z∗p and Compute: Com = gk1hνT
Pick the valid BB-signature corresponding to the element k : Ak = g1/(y+k)
Choose l ∈ Z∗p and Compute (see remark 1): B = Alk; B1 = B−1; D = Bk1 gl
Choose k1, l1, r1 ∈ Z∗p and Compute: Com1 = gk11 hr1T and D1 = Bk11 gl1
Real time computations:
Compute: c = H(Com,B,D,Com1, D1, ch)
ch
−−−−−−−−−Choose ch ∈ Z∗p (A random challenge)
s1 = k1 + c× k mod p; s2 = r1 + c× v mod p;
s3 = l1 + c× l mod p; Check that B 6= 1G1
Π = Com,B,D, s1, s2, s3
Π
• If the verifier and the designated entity are the same entity,
it implies that the verifier holds the private signature key y
(First case). Hence the prover does not send the value D.
The verifier can compute it: D = By and goes to (*)
• Otherwise, if the verifier doesn’t know the private signature
key y (Second case), then, it checks that e(D, g3) = e(B, Y )
and goes to (*)
(*) Compute: C˜ = gs11 h
s2
T Com
−c and D˜ = Bs11 gs3D−c
Check that: c = H(Com,B,D, C˜, D˜, ch)
Fig. 4. A new efficient set membership proof
mitment Com belongs to the set Φ which comes down
to proving knowledge of the BB-signature Ak.
Remark 1: Proving knowledge of a valid BB-
signature Ak = g1/(y+k) on a value k committed in
Com = gk1hνT , without revealing neither k nor the
signature and without using pairings on the prover’s
side can be done as follows. The prover first random-
izes Ak by choosing a random value l ∈ Z∗p and com-
putes B = Alk. Since Ak = g1/(y+k) this implies that
B = Alk = (gl)1/(y+k) and then that By+k = gl. It im-
plies, if we note B1 = B−1 and D = By that D = Bk1gl.
As a result, in order to prove that the value k com-
mitted in Com belongs to the set Φ, the prover just has
to send B and D to the verifier and compute the fol-
lowing ZKPK: Π = POK(k, ν, l : Com = gk1hνT ∧ D =
Bk1g
l). The computation of the ZKPK Π is described in
Figure 4.
Upon receiving Π, the verifier proceeds to the ver-
ification. We distinguish two cases. In the first case,
the verifier and the designated authority are the same.
Thus, the verifier holds the private signature key y. Con-
sequently, the verification of Π occurs without requir-
ing any pairing computations. This implies that our set
membership proof does not require pairing computa-
tions for either the prover or the verifier. In the second
case, the verifier does not have the private signature key
y of the designated authority. Then, the verifier needs
to perform some pairing computations in order to verify
Π. Nevertheless, the prover still has no pairing compu-
tations to perform. This is particularly interesting for
the m-ticketing use case.
Theorem 2. If the |Φ|−SDH assumption holds,
then the protocol in Figure 4 is a zero-knowledge ar-
gument of set membership for a set Φ. The proof is in
Appendix B.
7 Our m-ticketing protocol
This section begins with an overview of our protocol
which main notations are summarized in Table 1, be-
fore moving to our m-ticketing protocol and its post-
payment aspects.
7.1 Overview
We assume that m-tickets have a unique rate per area
such as in Paris [50], Berlin [4] and Moscow [38] under-
grounds. The user can have different types of m-tickets
sets such that every set is characterized by a rate, an
area and the number of available m-tickets (maxticket),
e.g., a set of 10 m-tickets valid in area 1 and the price
of one m-ticket is 1.30€.
As shown in Figure 5, at the beginning, the user
registers at the transport service. Then, he retrieves a
permission token A from the transport authority. This
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G1,G2,GT Multiplicative groups of prime order p
g,g0,g1,gt,
gT ,gU ,h,G,H Generators of G1
(xT , hT ) ElGamal private and public keys of the revoca-
tion authorities
((a, b), (n, pP )) Pailler private and public keys of the revocation
authorities
(γ, (W,W ′)) BB-signature scheme private and public keys of
the transport authority
(y, Y ) BB-signature private and public keys of the
transport authority for set membership proof
(xU , hU ) Private and public key of the user
A A permission token
IDU The identity of the user
T ickk The kth m-ticket
Bk The serial number of the kth m-ticket
E The ElGamal encryption of the user secret cor-
responding to his set of m-tickets
Π A proof (POK)
ch A challenge
DBREG The TA secure registration database
DBUsedT ickets A secure database where the TA centralises the
used m-tickets
Table 1. Notation used in the m-ticketing protocol
token enables the generation of maxticket m-tickets (an
m-ticket set). The token A is a BB-signature on a secret
s known only by the user. The secret s identifies a type
of m-tickets set.
At the validation phase, the user authenticates the
validator and sends an m-ticket T ickk: (Bk, E,Π). Bk
is a unique serial number of the m-ticket, E is an El-
Gamal encryption of gs1, and Π is a ZKPK. Π proves
that (1) the user has a valid BB-signature on s with-
out revealing neither s nor the signature A, (2) E is an
encryption of gs1 without revealing s and (3) k belongs
to [1..maxticket] without revealing k. (3) is based on the
new set membership proof of Section 6.
Finally, the user post-pays by regularly reporting
unused m-tickets i.e. by revealing the unused m-ticket
serial numbers Bk to the TA. This enables to detect
any malicious behaviour, i.e., validating more m-tickets
than what were obtained, without breaking the user’s
privacy. Additional countermeasures allows to recover
the user’s identity and retrieve his m-tickets, with the
agreement of the authorities.
7.2 Model
Setup of public parameters. Let g, g0, g1, gt, gT , gU ,
h, G, H be nine generators of G1 and g2, g3 two gener-
ators of G2. The user’s SIM card will perform compu-
SIM
Secret s
Generate {Bk}
of size maxticket
Transport Authority
Validator (IDV )
DBREG
DBUsedTickets
Registration: (IDU , hU ) store
Permission Token: A
(A,C0, s2, c, µ) sto
re
Reporting unused Bk check
Verification of Π
ch
T ickk:
(Bk, E,Π)
stor
e (B
k
, E
,Π,
ID
V
, D
T )
Ticket
Validation
RSA Signature of
TS: timestamp
RCV : challenge
RSA(RCV , TS)
Challenge RCV
Auth.
Authorities
User identity
revocation
E g
s
1
R
ec
ov
er
id
en
tit
y
Search
user tickets
C0 s1
Search
Bk
Fig. 5. The m-ticketing protocol overview
tations only in G1 (note that current SIM cards are not
designed to handle pairing computations nor computa-
tions in G2 or GT ).
Revocation authorities. The revocation author-
ities set two pairs of keys: a private and public keys of
the threshold ElGamal cryptosystem (pkRG, skRG) and
a private and public keys of the threshold Paillier cryp-
tosystem (pkRP , skRP ).
We assume that the private keys are shared among
the revocation authorities (e.g. using the technique pro-
posed in [30] for El Gamal and in [26] for Paillier). In
order to decrypt a ciphertext, a minimal number t (the
threshold) of these authorities should cooperate.
The public key, pkRG, consists of the elements
(gT , hT = gxTT ), where gT is a random generator of
G1, and the corresponding private key, skRG, is formed
by xT ∈ Z∗p. Let a and b be random primes for which
a, b > 2, a 6= b, |a| = |b| and gcd(ab, (a− 1)(b− 1)) = 1;
let n = ab, Π = lcm(a− 1, b− 1), K = Π−1 mod n, and
gP = (1 + n); then the public key, pkRP , is (n, gP ) and
the secret key, skRP , is (a, b).
Transport authority. The transport authority
(TA) sets for each group, i.e. a type of m-tickets set,
a key pair of the BB-signature scheme. The private key
is a random element γ ∈ Z∗p and the corresponding pub-
lic key isW ′ = gγ0 andW = g
γ
2 . The transport authority
sets another key pair of the BB-signature scheme which
will be used for the “Set membership proof”. The private
key is a random element y ∈ Z∗p and the corresponding
public key is Y = gy3 .
User. The user owns a public/private key pair
(xU ∈ Z∗p, hU = gxUU ). During the permission to-
ken request, the user obtains from TA a token A =
(gs1h)1/(γ+r). s is jointly chosen by TA and the user but
is only known by the user (whereas both know r).
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User Transport Authority
Public input: The public parameters Public Input: The public parameters
Private Input: xU Private Input: γ,DBREG
Choose s1 ∈ Z∗p, j ∈]0, n[
Compute: Com = gs11 , C0 = g
s1
P j
n mod n2
Π1 = POK(s1, j : Com = gs11 ∧ C0 = gs1P jn mod n2)
Com,Π1,C0−−−−−−−−−−−−− Verify Π1
Choose s2 ∈ Z∗p and Let s = s1 + s2 mod p,
then Com× gs21 = gs11 gs21 = gs1+s21 = gs1 = c
Choose r ∈ Z∗p and Compute: A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r)
Verify Π2 and Compute:
A,r,g
s2
1 ,Π2−−−−−−−−−−−−− and Π2 = POK(γ : W ′ = gγ0 ∧Aγ = c× hA−r)
c = gs11 g
s2
1 = g
s1+s2
1 = gs1, µ = Sign(xU , A, g
s1
1 , g
s2
1 )
µ−−−−−−−−−−−−− Verify µ
Compute: s = s1 + s2
s2−−−−−−−−−−−−− Save (A,C0, s2, c, µ) associated to (IDU , hU ) in
DBREG
Fig. 6. The protocol of the permission token request
7.3 M-ticketing protocol
Our protocol is divided in three phases: user registra-
tion, permission token request and validation. The later
includes the validator authentication and the m-ticket
validation.
7.3.1 User registration phase
We denote by IDU a user’s identity and DBREG the
database where the TA saves the identities of registered
users. First, the user sends his public key hU and his
identity IDU to TA. Then, he signs, using Schnorr sig-
nature scheme [46], a random challenge rc received from
TA, using his private key xU . If the signature is valid,
TA saves the tuple (IDU , hU ) inDBREG. Then, the user
securely introduces his banking credentials in order to
be subsequently charged.
7.3.2 Permission token request phase
The permission token request phase is detailed in Fig-
ure 6. A permission token (A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r), r) con-
sists of an (extended) BB-signature [10] on s (the secret
member group key only known by the user, whereas r is
known by the user and TA). Thanks to his permission
token, the user will be able to use maxticket m-tickets.
The value of maxticket is set by TA and linked to the
key pair (γ,W = gγ2 ) used by TA during the permission
token request protocol. TA will use a different pair of
keys for each possible value of maxticket, i.e., for each
group associated to each type of m-tickets set.
At the end of this phase, TA saves in DBREG the
view (A,C0, s2, c, µ) where C0 is the Paillier encryption
of s1 such that the secret s = s1 + s2 and (c, µ) are the
commitment and signature by the user of his secret s.
7.3.3 Validation phase
In this phase, the validator is authenticated, the per-
mission token is verified and finally the m-ticket is val-
idated.
Validator authentication. The validator authen-
tication consists of a challenge / response protocol. The
user sends a Random Challenge RCV to the validator
gate. Upon receiving RCV , the validator replies with the
RSA signature on a timestamp (TS) and the received
challenge (we use a short public verification exponent
v in order to have a fast verification in the SIM card).
Then, the m-ticketing cardlet checks the received signa-
ture. If it succeeds, the m-ticketing cardlet checks the
validity of the permission token based on the timestamp
(TS) sent by the validator. Indeed, if TS is lower than
D (TS < D), the permission token is still valid. Then,
the cardlet checks whether the number of used m-tickets
reached maxticket, the number of authorized post-paid
m-tickets. If a check fails, the m-ticketing cardlet aborts
and the m-ticketing application displays a message to
ask the user to renew the permission token.
M-ticket validation. An m-ticket T ickk (indexed
k) is characterized by a serial number Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t
along with an ElGamal encryption E = (C1 = gaT , C2 =
gs1 × haT ) of gs1. To prove the validity of a m-ticket, the
user must prove that:
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– k belongs to Φ = [1..maxticket] using our new set
membership proof (described in Section 6),
– He knows a valid BB-signature A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r) on
s (without revealing both s and the signature),
– E is an encryption of gs1.
Therefore T ickk = (Bk, E,Π) where Π =
POK(k, a, s, r, A : Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t ∧A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r)∧
C1 = gaT ∧ C2 = gs1 × haT ∧ k ∈ [1..maxticket]).
Remark 2: Proving the knowledge of a valid BB-
signature A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r) on a value s, without reveal-
ing s or the signature and without using pairings on the
prover’s side can be done as follows:
The prover first randomizes A by choosing a ran-
dom value α ∈ Z∗p and computes B0 = Aα. Since A =
(gs1h)1/(γ+r) this implies that B0 = Aα = (gαs1 hα)1/(γ+r)
and then that:
Bγ+r0 = g
αs
1 h
α (1)
Let us note by B′ = B−10 and C = B
γ
0 . From (1), we
have:
C = gαs1 × hα ×B′r (2)
As a result, in order to prove that he knows a BB-
signature A on the value s, without revealing s nor the
corresponding signature, the prover just has to send B0
and C (that he can compute using (2)) to the verifier
and prove that he knows the representation of C with
respect to (g1, h, B′): ΠBB = POK(α, s, r :C = gαs1 ×
hα × B′r). The proof consists in B0, C and ΠBB (and
no pairing computations are needed on the prover’s side
to compute ΠBB). The verifier will have to check that
B0 6= 1G1 , that C = Bγ0 (via pairing computations or
by using the key γ if it owns this key) and that ΠBB
is valid. If all the verifications hold, the verifier will be
convinced that the prover knows a valid BB-signature.
As described in Figure 7, the validator verifies the
proof Π, saves the date and time of the operation DT ,
the serial number of the validated m-ticket Bk, the El
Gamal encryption E (of gs1) and the proof Π. These
verifications can be done in two ways. In the first case,
the validator holds the private keys γ (the private key of
TA) and y (the private key used during the set member-
ship). Hence, he can perform the verification of Π with-
out executing any pairing computations. In such a case,
the protocol is run without any pairing computations
either on the user side (SIM card) or on the validator
side. In the second case, the validator does not hold the
private keys γ and y. Therefore, in order to perform the
verification of Π, the validator would execute pairing
computations. We still achieve our goal, i.e., no pairing
computations at the user side (SIM card).
We emphasize that owing to our improvements on
Boneh-Boyen based Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature
scheme, all the computations (required to validate an m-
ticket) are performed by the SIM card. We do not need
to outsource part of the computations to the powerful
but untrusted mobile phone. Consequently, the user’s
privacy is ensured with respect to the smartphone itself.
Even a compromised mobile, e.g. containing a spyware,
cannot collect any information about our m-ticketing
application computations.
Theorem 3. The protocol in Figure 7 is a ZKPK
of a permission token (A, r, s) and a value k such that
Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t , k ∈ [1..maxticket] and E = (C1, C2) is
an El Gamal encryption of gs1. The proof is detailed in
Appendix C.
At the end of a successful m-ticket validation, the
validator sends (Bk, E,Π) to TA in order to be saved
within a centralized and secured databaseDBUsedTickets
jointly with his identity IDV and the date and time of
the transaction DT . In such a way, the TA will detect
any malicious behaviour such that a multiple usage or
cloning (cf. Section 7.4.2).
7.3.4 Revocation
We distinguish two levels of revocation: the user’s
anonymity revocation and the m-tickets revocation. In
the first case, the transport authority would like to get
the user’s identity corresponding to a given m-ticket. In
the second case, the transport authority would like to
revoke all the m-tickets of a given user, e.g., upon the re-
quest of the user further to the theft of his smartphone.
In order to recover a user’s identity based on a used
m-ticket T ickk = (Bk, E,Π), TA sends E to the re-
vocation authorities. Together, the revocation author-
ities decipher E and retrieve the commitment of s
(gs1). By using DBREG the database of registered users
and gs1, TA will find the user’s identity in the tuples
(A,C0, s2, c, µ, IDU , hU ).
In order to retrieve the m-tickets of a user based
on his identity IDU ′ , first of all, TA must find the tuple
(A,C0, s2, c, µ, IDU , hU ) fromDBREG such that IDU =
IDU ′ . Then, TA sends C0 (the Paillier encryption of
s1) to the revocation authorities. Similarly to the first
case, the revocation authorities decipher together C and
retrieve s1. Upon receiving s1, TA computes s = s1 +s2,
hence, it can retrieve all the m-tickets (Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t )
of the user.
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M-ticketing cardlet Validator
Public input: The public parameters and the
public keys of the revocation and transport
authorities hT ,W, Y . The sets Φ = [1..maxticket]
and
∑
= {A1, A2, ... , Amaxticket} where
Ai = g1/(y+i) for i ∈ Φ
Public Input: The public parameters, hT ,W, Y . The
sets Φ and
∑
Private Input: A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r), k (the index
of the ticket that will be used), s
Private Input: The private signature keys γ and y (in
some scenario)
D day: validity end date of the permission token
Pre-computations:
Compute Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t
Choose a ∈ Z∗p and Compute: C1 = gaT , C2 = gs1 × haT
Computation of elements involved in the proof that the user knows a valid signature on s
Choose α ∈ Z∗p and Compute (see remark 2): B0 = Aα; B′ = B−10 ; C = gαs1 × hα ×B′r
Choose r2, r3, r4, a1, d1, b1, α1, t, t1, t3, t4, t5, ν, d′, f ′ ∈ Z∗p
Compute: T ′ = GsHr2 ; β = αs; T ′′ = T ′αHr3 ; r5 = r3 + αr2(mod p); Com = gk1hνT
Pick the valid BB-signature corresponding to the element k: Ak = g1/(y+k)
Choose l ∈ Z∗p and Compute: B = Alk; B1 = B−1; D = Bk1 gl
Choose k1, l1, r1 ∈ Z∗p and Compute: Com1 = gk11 hr1T ; D1 = Bk11 gl1
δ = s+ k; f = a+ ν; K = gtB−1k = B
s+k
k
= Bδk; L = C2Com = g
s+k
1 h
a+ν
T = g
δ
1h
f
T
Computation of the witnesses
Compute: C′1 = g
a1
T ; C
′
2 = g
d1
1 × ha1T ; R′ = Gd1Ht1 ; R′′ = T ′α1Ht3 ;
C′ = gb11 hα1B′t; T ′4 = Gb1Ht5 ; K′ = Bd
′
k ; L
′ = gd′1 × hf
′
T
Real time computations
Validator authentication
Choose RCV ∈ Z∗p and Check that the number
of used m-tickets < maxticket
RCV−−−−−−−−−−−−− TS = getTimeStamp()
Compute:
Verify SignatureRSA and Check that TS < D
SignatureRSA−−−−−−−−−−−−−SignatureRSA, the RSA signature on RCV and TS
m-ticket Validation
Compute: c = H(C,C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com,B,
ch
−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose ch ∈ Z∗p
D,K,C′1, C
′
2, R
′, R′′, C′, T ′4, Com1, D1,K
′, L′, ch)
s1 = k1 + c× k mod p; s2 = r1 + c× ν mod p Check that B 6= 1G1
s3 = l1 + c× l mod p; ω1 = a1 + c× a mod p • If The validator holds the private signature keys y
and γ (First case). Hence the prover does not send
the value D and C. The verifier can compute it:
D = By , C = Bγ0 . Then goes to (*)
ω2 = d1 + c× s mod p; ω3 = t1 + c× r2 mod p
ω4 = b1 + c× β mod p; ω5 = α1 + c× α mod p
ω6 = t+ c× r mod p; ω8 = t3 + c× r3 mod p
ω10 = t5 + c× r5 mod p; ω11 = d′ + c× δ mod p • Otherwise, if the validator doesn’t know the private
signature key y and γ (Second case), then, check thatω12 = f ′ + c× f mod p
Let E = (C1, C2) and the proof e(D, g3) = e(B, Y ); e(C, g2) = e(B0,W ) and goes to (*)
Π = (C,B0, T ′, T ′′, Com, c,B,D, s1, s2, s3, (*) Compute: C˜ = gs11 h
s2
T Com
−c; D˜ = Bs11 gs3D−c;
ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6, ω8, ω9, ω10, ω11, ω12)
Bk, E,Π
C˜1 = gω1T C
−c
1 ; C˜2 = g
ω2
1 h
ω1
T C
−c
2 ; R˜′ = Gω2Hω3T ′−c;
C˜′ = gω41 hω5B′ω6C−c; R˜′′ = T ′ω5Hω8T ′′−c;
T˜4 = Gω4Hω10T ′′−c; K˜′ = Bω11k K
−c;
L˜′ = gω111 h
ω12
T L
−c
Check c = H(C,C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com,B,D,K,
C˜1, C˜2, R˜′, R˜′′, C˜′, T˜ ′4, C˜, D˜, K˜′, L˜′, ch)
Send (Bk, E,Π, IDV , DT ) to TA in order to be saved
within the secured database DBUsedTickets; IDV is
the identity of the validator and DT is the date and
time of the transaction.
Fig. 7. The validation protocol
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7.4 A secure Post-payment process
One novelty of our m-ticketing protocol, in addition to
the respect of users’ privacy, is to give the ability to
charge a user after the usage of m-tickets.
7.4.1 Regular reporting
In a post-payment approach, the m-ticketing application
must report unused m-tickets to the back-end server,
before the pre-defined D day. Thus, the regular reports
does not question the privacy of the user. The follow-
ing example gives further clarification. Suppose that the
user retrieved a permission token of 5 m-tickets. Be-
fore D day, he used 4 m-tickets, i.e., m-tickets number
1, 2, 3 and 4. On D day, the m-ticketing application
will report to the back-end server the m-ticket number
5 using a network connection. The report contains B5
= g1/s+5+1t and the proof Π = POK(k, s, r, A : B5 =
g
1/(s+5+1)
t ∧A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r) ∧ 5 ∈ [1..5]).
Regularly revealing the unused m-tickets enables
the transport authority to (1) charge the user, (2) check
the reliability and accuracy of the reports without ques-
tioning the user’s privacy. Indeed, the unlinkability of
user’s m-tickets (Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t , E,Π), both during
the use of the service and during the reporting phase,
is ensured owing to the q-DDHI and DDH assumptions
(cf. unlinkabililty proof).
7.4.2 Countermeasures
A malicious user’s goal simply consists on not paying or
paying less than what he is supposed to. To do so, he
may try to block the reporting or attack the cardlet of
the SIM.
If the user blocks network communications in order
to block reporting, the SIM cardlet will refuse to issue
m-tickets for a permission token after reaching the limit
of maxticket, or the limit of the time window controlled
by D. This countermeasure C relies on the security of
the SIM card.
If the user performs a successful physical attack
against the SIM card, which is extremely difficult [24],
he may try to (1) defeat the countermeasure C and
never do reports, or (2) use the same m-ticket several
times or (3) report a used m-ticket. This will be detected
in DBUsedTickets and TA can decide to break the user’s
anonymity and retrieve all his m-tickets usage history.
Thus, the user is forced to report his consumption
and renew his permission token lest the service is unus-
able or TA breaks his anonymity.
Note that forging an m-ticket is not possible, even
with a compromised SIM because of the unforgeability
property.
8 Security analysis
We prove that our m-ticketing protocol provides the se-
curity and privacy properties defined in Section 4.3.
Theorem 4 (Non-frameability). Our m-
ticketing protocol is non-frameable, in the random
oracle model, under the q-DDHI assumption.
The proof is detailed is Appendix E.
Theorem 5 (Unforgeability). Our m-ticketing
protocol satisfies the unforgeability requirement, in the
random oracle model, under the q-SDH assumption.
The proof is detailed is Appendix E.
Theorem 6 (Unlinkability). Our m-ticketing
protocol satisfies the unlinkability requirement, in the
random oracle model, under the q-DDHI and DDH as-
sumptions.
The proof is detailed is Appendix E.
9 Performance results
We implemented the user side of our solution on a SIM
card and the validator side in a regular PC (cf. Ap-
pendix D). We used a 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig curve [1]
over Fq since this family of curves provides an optimal
size for G1 and G2 while preventing the MOV attack [37]
due to their embedding degree of 12. G1 is the group of
Fq - rational points of order p and G2 is the subgroup of
trace zero points in E(Fq12)[p]. Our pairing is of type-
3 [29]. More details are given in Appendix D.
Pre-computations. The pre-computations for
preparing one signature occurs in 1.7 s. It consists in
computing elements involved in proving that the user
knows a valid signature on his secret s. The total size of
the elements that the card has to store for one signature
is 1130 bytes (24 Zp elements, 10 compressed points and
one digest output).
Validation phase. Table 2 gives timings (average
over 50 trials and standard deviation between parenthe-
ses) for the whole validation protocol which includes the
validator authentication, the signature generation and
an m-ticket verification. The timings include as well the
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Validator Card Signature Verification by PC Total
authentication + NFC connection (1) without pairing (2) with pairing (1) (2)
Battery-On 56, 98(0.70) 123.01(3.24) 4.43(1.32) 12.19(3.20) 184.25(3.43) 191.80(4.73)Battery-Off 76.55(7.46) 185.28(18.68) 266.52(17.91) 272.55(25.73)
Table 2. Timings of m-ticket validation protocol including validator authentication (ms)
NFC exchanges duration. We denote by “Battery-Off”
a powered-off phone either by the user, or because the
battery is flat. In this situation, as stated by NFC stan-
dards, NFC-access to the SIM card is still possible, but
with degraded performances.
Regarding the validator authentication, we chose to
use RSA with a 1984 bits key (this is the greatest size
supported by the SIM card) and a short public verifi-
cation exponent v (v = 65537). The validator asks the
card for a challenge (RCV ). Then, he sends back his
response to this challenge, his own challenge (ch) (32
bytes) and the current date (TS) (6 bytes).
The column “Card signature” gives the duration of
real-time computations of a signature (computing an m-
ticket Bk, E and Π) and the NFC communication time.
The considered operations for generating the signature
are only one hash value and lightweight operations in
Zp. The size of the computed signature is 778 bytes (sent
by 4 APDUs). Regarding the communication between a
SIM card and a reader, it is slow (≥ 85ms), but the
whole process (Signature+NFC) remains very fast, i.e.,
123.01ms on average.
For the signature verification by the validator, we
distinguish two cases: the validator holds the private
signature keys (y, γ), or not. The extra pairing com-
putations performed in the second case do not add an
important delay to the verification because a regular
desktop PC can efficiently achieve such computations.
In total, the m-ticket validation occurs for the first
case (without pairing at the verifier side) in 184.25ms
on average and in 191.80ms for the second case (with
pairing at the verifier side). When the battery is flat,
the validation occurs in at most 272.55ms on average.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed various cryptographic en-
hancements: (1) optimizations of BB-signature schemes
and (2) a new set-membership proof that does not re-
quire pairing computations at the prover side. These
contributions enable to design efficient protocols over
NFC. Then, based on these cryptographic primitives, we
designed a secure m-ticketing protocol that prevents a
malicious transport authority from linking users’ trips.
Moreover, as the entire computations are done within
the SIM card, we enhance the user’s privacy with re-
gards to a compromised smartphone. Owing to regu-
lar reports of unused m-tickets, the user is able to se-
curely post-pay for his m-tickets without disclosing any
information about the performed trips. Moreover, we
planned countermeasures against m-ticket cloning and
multiple usage. Finally, we prove that our protocol is
completely off-line and efficient: the validation occurs
in 184.25ms and in 266.52ms when the battery is flat.
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A Privacy weakness of Rupp et
al. protocol
In the following, we give further details about the pay-
ment protocol for public transport proposed by Rupp
et al. at FC 2013 [44]. Then, we present an attack that
enables a malicious transport authority to break users’
privacy.
At first, the user buys a trip authorization token
(TATi) which consists of an (extended) coin in Brands’
scheme [52]. This token enables the user to perform one
trip. Then, the user receives a fresh refund token (RT =
SNRT such that SNRT ← G), sets a variable R to 1
and υ to 0. R will be used to aggregate blinding factors
and υ is the refund amount. At the entry turnstile, the
user shows a TATi and proves its ownership. Right after
this, the user receives a refund calculation token (RCTi)
which consists of a MAC on TATi, a timestamp and the
reader ID. At the turnstile of the exit, the user shows his
RCT and proves the ownership of the TATi contained
within it. In addition, he collects refund on his RT , as
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Collecting Refund
User Exit turnstile
r ← Z∗p
ω←−−−−−−−−−− Determine the refund ω
based on the received
information in RCT
RT ′ = RT r RT
′
−−−−−−−−−−−→
υ = υ + ω, RT
′′
←−−−−−−−−−−− RT ′′ = RT ′dω (1)
R = Rr mod p,
RT = RT ′′
Redeeming Refund
User Transport authority
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Fig. 8. The refund protocols of Rupp et al. [44]
described in Figure 8. A refund value ω is represented
as a ω-times BLS signature [51] SNd
ω
RT such that d is
the secret BLS signature key of the transport authority.
Later, the user redeems his RT . This consists on sending
a blinded version of his RT (RT ′ = RT r), SNRT , R
and the collected amount υ to the transport authority.
The latter checks the validity of both SNRT and the
signature:
e(SNRRT , hd
υ
) ?= e(RT ′, h) (3)
In [44], Rupp et al. assume that, for efficiency reasons,
users don’t verify their RTs. Indeed, verifications of re-
fund tokens (step 1 in Figure 8) is too costly and can not
be handled by constrained devices such as SIM cards.
This lack of verification could lead to serious privacy
weaknesses: a malicious transport authority could link
users’ trips.
More precisely, for a given station, the transport au-
thority is able to identify all the users who left at this
station. To this end, in step (1) in Figure 8, instead
of computing RT ′′ = RT ′d
ω
, the transport authority
chooses a variable t ← Z∗p and computes RT ′′=RT ′td
ω
.
The user will not detect that RT ′′ is improperly calcu-
lated because there is no verification on the user’s side.
The refund token RT will then carry on the exponent
t till the redeeming refund step, i.e., RT ′ = SN t
jRdυ
RT
where j corresponds to the number of times the user
left the targeted station, R is the product of all the
variables r and υ is the sum of all the refunds ω. At the
redeeming refund step, upon receiving the serial num-
ber SNRT , the blinded version of the refund token RT ′,
the refund amount υ, and the aggregate blinding factor
R, the transport authority will as usual check the va-
lidity of SNRT and whether the amount is within the
allowed range [0, p− 1]. Now, in order to verify the sig-
nature and distinguish users who exited at the relevant
station, the transport authority starts by checking the
relation 13). If equation (3) holds, this implies that the
user did not left the targeted station. Otherwise, the
transport authority checks:
e(SN t
jR
RT , h
dυ ) = e(SNRT , h)t
jRdυ =
e(SN t
jRdυ
RT , h) = e(RT ′, h) (4)
To do so, the transport authority will repeat the compu-
tations with different values of j until the relation (4)
holds. When e(SN t
jR
RT , h
dυ ) ?= e(RT ′, h) equation (4)
holds, this implies that the user left the targeted sta-
tion j times.
In order to monitor several stations at the same
time, the transport authority will have a list of vari-
ables t, e.g., tA for station A, tB for station B, etc. At
the redeeming refund step, the transport authority will
test different values of t until it finds the ones that sat-
isfy the relation (5):
e(SN
∏
tjxx R
RT , h
dυ ) ?= e(RT ′, h) (5)
where tx characterizes a station x and jx represents the
number of exits at the station x. For instance, if the
user left the station A four times, the station B twice
and the station M once, relation (5) will be as follows:
e(SN t
4
At
2
Bt
1
MR
RT , h
dυ ) ?= e(RT ′, h). In this way, the trans-
port authority will be able to identify the users that left
a pool of targeted stations but also the number of times
they exited at these stations: this clearly implies that
users’ trips are linkable.
However, solving relation (5) and finding the right
tuples (tx, jx), becomes quickly a complex and unman-
ageable task when the number of targeted stations in-
creases (more than three for example). To mitigate this,
a malicious transport authority could only monitor two
stations at the same time and periodically change these
monitored stations. In this way, the transport author-
ity will be able to monitor a large number of stations
and will have a global overview of the users’ journeys
which breaks the privacy property of Rupp et al. system.
We would like to emphasize that privacy holds in P4R
(Rupp et al. system [44]) if we assume that the transport
authority is “honest but curious”, i.e., it will not deviate
from the refund protocol, but such an assumption is too
strong in the context of transport systems [54].
In order to mitigate this issue, the user should check
the received refund (Step (1) in Figure 8). This verifi-
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cation implies pairing computations. However, in con-
straint environments such as the SIM card, this is not
feasible yet. A straightforward solution would be to del-
egate these computations to the smartphone. Such a
solution has two main drawbacks. On the one hand,
delegating computations to an untrusted environment,
i.e., the smartphone which could be compromised by
spywares, will affect the user’s privacy. On the other
hand, verifying the received refund token would lead to
inefficient transactions at exit turnstiles.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Sketch of proof. The completeness of the protocol
follows by inspection. The soundness follows from the
extraction property of the underlying proof of knowl-
edge and the unforgeability of the underlying signature
scheme. In particular, the extraction property implies
that for any prover P ∗ that convinces V with probabil-
ity , there exists an extractor which interacts with P ∗
and outputs a witness (k, v, l) with probability poly().
Moreover, if we assume that the extractor input consists
of two transcripts, i.e., {Y,
∑
, Com,B,D, c, c˜, s1, s˜1, s2,
s˜2, s3, s˜3}. The witness can be obtained by computing
(all the computations are done mod p): l = (s3−s˜3)/(c−
c˜) and k = (s1 − s˜1)/(c− c˜); ν = (s2 − s˜2)/(c− c˜);
The extractor succeeds when (c− c˜) is invertible in
Zp. If the following check D = By holds , this implies
that: D = By = Bk1gl. Therefore, ByBk = gl. Let us
denote by Ak = B1/l. Note that we necessarily have
l 6= 0, otherwise this would imply that the prover knows
the secret value y (which would be equal to −k mod p).
We therefore have Ay+kk = g and consequently that
Ak = g1/(y+k). So the prover knows a valid BB-signature
on the value k. This implies that k ∈ Φ.
Also note that if D = By then this implies that the
Prover P only knows one representation ofD in the base
B1 and g. Otherwise this would imply that P knows
the private key y. Indeed, suppose that P knows two
representations of D in the base B1 and g. Let us denote
by (k, l) and (k˜, l˜) these two representations. Since G1 is
a prime order group and B1 6= 1 and g 6= 1, this implies
that k 6= k˜ and l 6= l˜. Since D = Bk1gl = Bk˜1gl˜, this
implies that Bk−k˜1 = gl−l˜ and that B
(k−k˜)/(l−l˜)
1 = g. Let
us denote by y˜ = (k−k˜)/(l− l˜). Then D = By = Bk1gl =
B−kB−(ly˜). Since G1 is a prime order group this implies
that y = −k − ly˜.
If k /∈ Φ, then P ∗ can be directly used to mount
a weak-chosen attack against the BB-signature scheme
with probability poly() of succeeding. Thus  must be
negligible.
Finally, to prove (honest-verifier) zero-
knowledge, we construct a simulator Sim that will
simulate all interactions with any (honest verifier) V ∗.
1. Sim retrieves Y and
∑
from V ∗.
2. Sim randomly chooses k ∈ Φ and l ∈ Z∗p and com-
putes B = Alk , B1 = B(−1) and D = Bk1gl.
3. Sim randomly chooses c, s1, s2, s3 ∈ Z∗p and com-
putes Com1 = gs11 h
s2
T Com
−c and D1 = Bs11 gs3D−c.
4. Sim outputs S = {Com,B,D,Com1, D1, c, s1, s2,
s3}.
Since G1 is a prime order group, then the blinding is
perfect in the first two steps and S and V ∗’s view of the
protocol are statistically indistinguishable.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Sketch of proof. The completeness follows by in-
spection.
Soundness: roughly speaking, the whole proof Π
can be divided in three sub-proofs Π1, Π2 and Π3, where:
Π1 = POK(α, s, r, r2, r3, r5, a : C = gαs1 ×hα×B′r∧T ′ =
GsHr2 ∧ T ′′ = T ′αHr3 = GαsHr5 ∧ C1 = gaT ∧ C2 =
gs1 × haT )
Π2 = POK(k, ν, s, r2 : Com = gk1hνT ∧ T ′ = GsHr2 ∧
K = gtB−1k = B
s+k
k )
Π3 = POK(k, ν, l : Com = gk1hνT ∧D = Bk1gl)
If the verifier accepts the proof Π this means that:
D = By (1) and C = Bγ0 (2).
Note that the proofs Π1, Π2 and Π3 are classical
variants of Schnorr’s proof of knowledge. Using the “ex-
tractors” of these proofs of knowledge, we can retrieve
k, α, s, r, l.
From (1) we have: D = By = Bk1gl. This implies
that ByBk = gl. Let us denote by Ak = B1/l. (Note
that l 6= 0, otherwise this would imply that the prover
knows the secret value y). We therefore have Ay+kk = g
and therefore that Ak = g1/(y+k). So the prover knows
a valid BB-signature on the value k. This implies that
k ∈ [1..maxticket].
From (2) we have that C = Bγ0 = gαs1 × hα × B′r.
This implies that Bγ+r0 = gαs1 × hα. Let us denote by
A = B1/α0 , this implies that Aγ+r = gs1 × h (Note that
α 6= 0, otherwise this would imply that the prover knows
the secret value γ). So A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r). The prover
therefore knows a valid permission token (A, r, s).
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In conclusion, the prover knows a permission to-
ken (A, r, s) and a value k such that Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t ,
k ∈ [1..maxticket] and E = (C1, C2) is an El Gamal
encryption of gs1.
(Honest-verifier) Zero-Knowledge: since Π1,
Π2 and Π3 are classical ZKPK, we can easily con-
struct simulators Sim1, Sim2 and Sim3 (respectively)
for such proofs. From these simulators, it is straightfor-
ward to construct a simulator Sim that will simulate all
interactions with any (honest) verifier V ∗. Since G1 is a
prime order group, then the blinding would be perfect
and the output of Sim and V ∗’s view of the protocol
would be statistically indistinguishable.
D Platform and implementation
details
D.1 SIM card details
We used Javacard 2.2 for developing all the crypto-
graphic computations into the SIM card. In particular,
the SIM card has access to the functions handling el-
liptic curves operations. The SIM card handles requests
from the validator using the NCF contactless interface.
D.2 Validator details
The validator has been developed in Java and Scala.
The Java software uses a native library for EC scalar
multiplications and pairings. This library depends on
libGMP for big integers computations and benefits from
its assembly optimizations. Furthermore, computations
are distributed between threads (at JVM level) to bene-
fit from the multi-core architecture of the PC. The PC is
an Intel(R) Xeon(R) with a E5-1620 CPU with 4 cores
running at 3.70GHz under a 64-bit Linux OS. The NFC
reader of the validator is an Omnikey 5321 dual inter-
faces.
D.3 Curve and Pairing Parameters
The curve and pairing parameters that we used in the
implementation of our m-ticketing system are:
q = 8243401665430090752057404098378368203946728292799613002
4655912292889294264593
p = 8243401665430090752057404098378368203918016968090658713
6896645255465309139857
b = 5
E Security proofs
E.1 Preliminaries
Discrete Logarithm (DL). For any multiplicative
group G of prime order p, the DL assumption states
that given a random generator g ∈ G and a candidate
Y ∈ G, it is hard to find an integer y mod p such that
Y = gy.
One-more Discrete Logarithm (OMDL) [2].
For any multiplicative group G of prime order p, the
OMDL assumption states that given a random genera-
tor g ∈ G, a challenge oracle that produces a random
group element Yi when queried and a discrete logarithm
oracle (with respect to g), it is hard to find, after t
queries to the challenge oracle (where t is chosen by the
adversary) and at most t− 1 queries to the discrete log-
arithm oracle, the discrete logarithms of all t elements
Yi.
q-Strong Diffie-Hellman I (q-SDH-I). For any
multiplicative group G1 of prime order p, the q-SDH-I
assumption states that given three random generators
(g0, g1, h)∈ G31, a value W ′ = gγ0 , an oracle O that on
input a value s ∈ Zp outputs a pair (r, A = (gs1h)1/(γ+r))
with r ∈ Zp , it is hard to output a new triplet
(r′, s′, A′ = (gs
′
1 h)1/(γ+r
′)), with (r′, s′) ∈ Z2p such that
s′ has never been queried to O.
Lemma 1. If the q-SDH assumption holds in G1
then the q-SDH-I assumption holds in G1.
Proof. See [28] for a proof of this Lemma.
Remark: The triplet (r′, s′, A′) corresponds to a
permission token of our m-ticketing protocol. In the se-
quel, we will call the oracle O, a BB-signature oracle
and the value s′ the (permission) token secret.
Forking Lemma. We use the Forking Lemma [43]
in our proofs, to prove that an adversary A is not able
to produce a new valid m-ticket T ickk (respectively a
Schnorr’s signature µ, see Figure 6) unless he knows
all the underlying secrets (a, s, r, A, k) (respectively the
secret xU ).
Using the notation of [43], if an adversary is able to
produce a valid ticket T ickk (k, σ1, h, σ2) where
σ1=(C, C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C
′
1, C
′
2, R′,
R′′, C ′, T
′
4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′, ch),
h=H(C, C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C
′
1, C
′
2,
R′, R′′, C ′, T
′
4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′, ch) and
σ2=(s1, s2, s3, ω1, ω2, ..., ω12),
then it can produce two valid m-tickets (k, σ1, h, σ2) and
(k, σ1, h′, σ2) such that h 6= h′.
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E.2 Proof of non-frameability
Sketch of proof. We assume that the challenger C
in the experiment ExpNfraA (1
λ) receives a random in-
stance (gx1 , gx2 , ..., gxl) of the one-more DL problem
where g is a random generator in G1. C will run the ad-
versary A as a subroutine and act as A’s challenger in
the non-frameability experiment. Because C is against
the one-more DL assumption, he has access to a DL or-
acle. C picks three random values ξ1, ξ2 and ξ3 in Zp and
computes g1 = gξ1 , gU = gξ2 and G = gξ31 . The other
generators of the m-ticketing system are randomly cho-
sen. A chooses the keys tsk for the transport authority
and rsk for the revocation authority and C chooses the
key skRP for the Paillier encryption scheme. C is there-
fore able to construct the public parameters pp for A
and can answer to its requests in the following way:
– ORegisterHU requests: C answers using his input of
the one-more DL problem. C puts hUi= (gxi)ξ2= gxiU
– ORegisterMU requests: C does not need to do any-
thing.
– OCorruptUser requests: C uses is DL oracle to give
the corresponding xi to the adversary.
– OTokenRequestU requests: C first uses his input of
the one-more DL problem to compute the commit-
ment Com: C puts Com= (gxj )ξ1= gxj1 . If the pro-
tocol does not abort then we put s=xj+s2 mod p
and c = gs1, where xj is unknown to C and s2 is pro-
vided by A. In the random oracle model, C is able
to perfectly simulate the proof of knowledge Π1 as
well as the Schnorr’s signature µ.
– OGenTicket(IDU , view) requests: All the values in-
volved in the computation of an m-ticket T ickk can
be easily simulated by C except T ′ and Bk. To com-
pute T ′ = GsHr2 where r2 is a random value chosen
by C, it proceeds as follows: T ′ = (Com×gs21 )ξ3Hr2
= GsHr2 . As C does not know the value s it can-
not compute or simulate the value Bk = g1/(s+k+1)t .
It will therefore choose a random value R and de-
fine Bk as R. In the random oracle model, C can
simulate the proof of knowledge Π using standard
techniques. The simulation is not perfect since we
replace the value Bk by a random value R. However
A will not detect this change unless he can solve the
q-DDHI problem.
– OReportT icket(IDU , view) requests: C proceeds as
in an OGenTicket request for each unused m-ticket.
Now, we assume that the adversary A manages to pro-
duce a valid m-ticket T ickk such that it breaks the non-
frameability of our m-ticketing protocol and it mades t
requests to the OCorruptUser oracle. This means that
this m-ticket has not been obtained on a OGenTicket
query and the IdentUser algorithm on T ickk outputs
an identifier IDU which is in HU along with a Schnorr’s
signature µ that proves that this m-ticket comes from a
permission token obtained by this user4 .
It follows from the Forking Lemma that if A is able
to produce a valid m-ticket T ickk (k, σ1, h, σ2) where
σ1=(C, C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C
′
1, C
′
2, R′,
R′′, C ′, T
′
4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′, ch),
h=H(C, C1, C2, B0, T ′, T ′′, Com, B, D, K, C
′
1, C
′
2,
R′, R′′, C ′, T
′
4, Com1, D1, K ′, L′, ch) and
σ2=(s1, s2, s3, ω1, ω2, ..., ω12) then it can produce two
valid m-tickets (k, σ1, h, σ2) and (k, σ1, h′, σ2) such that
h 6= h′. Using the technique of replay and the soundness
property of the proof Π, one is able to extract all the
secret values (a, s, r, A, k).
First case: the value s corresponds to a permission
token obtained during an OTokenRequestU on IDUi
(i.e., gs1 is equal to the value c produced during such
a request). C outputs the t values xi that comes from
the requests to the DL oracle plus the value xj = s −
s2 mod p and so breaks the one-more DL assumption.
Second case: the value s does not correspond to a
permission token obtained during an OTokenRequestU
on IDUi (meaning that all the values c generated dur-
ing such requests are different from gs1). We know by the
definition of the experiment that no OCorruptUser or-
acle query (and consequently no DL oracle query) has
been made on this identity. Therefore the public key
hUi corresponding to IDUi is in the one-more DL prob-
lem input. It follows from the Forking Lemma that if
A is sufficiently efficient to produce such a signature µ,
then there exists an algorithm A’ which can produce
two Schnorr’s signatures with non-negligible probabil-
ity. Using the techniques of replay and soundness, C is
able to extract the private key xU used to generate the
signature µ. C outputs the t values xi, coming from the
requests to the DL oracle, plus the value xUi and so
breaks the one-more DL assumption.
We prove the non-frameability under the q-DDHI
and one-more discrete logarithm assumptions [2]. We
use in fact the OMDL assumption to get a better reduc-
tion, but the proof can also be done under the discrete
logarithm assumption. As the q-DDHI assumption im-
plies the DL one, we can conclude that our m-ticketing
4 We would like to emphasize that since the output of IdentUser can
be publicly verifiable, a wrong IdentUser procedure is statistically
negligible (even for a powerful adversary).
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protocol is non-frameable, in the random oracle model,
under the q-DDHI assumption.
E.3 Proof of unforgeability
Sketch of proof. Let A be an adversary who breaks
the unforgeability requirement of our m-ticketing pro-
tocol with non-negligible probability. We will construct
an algorithm B, using A as an oracle, which breaks the
q-SDH-I assumption. B receives on input from its chal-
lenger (G1, g0, g1, gU h, W ′ = gγ0 ) the public parame-
ters of the q-SDH-I challenge and has access to a BB-
signature oracle. The other generators of the m-ticketing
system are randomly chosen.
B also chooses the keys for the Paillier encryption
scheme. It sends W ′ and the public key of the Paillier
scheme to A. The private and public keys of the El
Gamal cryptosystem can be chosen either by A or B. B
is therefore able to construct the public parameters pp
for A and can answer to its requests as follow:
– ORegisterHU requests: B randomly chooses xU ∈
Zp and computes hU = gxUU .
– ORegisterMU requests: B does not need to do any-
thing.
– OCorruptUser requests: B gives xU to A.
– OTokenRequestT requests: B plays as follows: B
first receives a Paillier encryption C0. It decrypts it
(recall that B chose the private key for the Paillier
encryption scheme) and retrieve the corresponding
plaintext s1. It then queries the BB-signature oracle
on s where s = s1 + s2 and s2 is randomly chosen
by B. The BB-signature oracle sends back a pair
(r,A = (gs1h)1/(y+r)) with r ∈ Zp , and B trans-
mits it to A along with the value s2. So B perfectly
simulates the OTokenRequestT for A.
– OGenTicket(IDU , view) requests: since B knows
the values of all the tokens (A, r, s) that have been
issued duringOTokenRequestT requests, it can eas-
ily answer to OGenTicket queries. The simulation
of this oracle is perfect.
– OReportT icket(IDU , view) requests: B proceeds as
in an OGenTicket request for each unused m-ticket.
We differentiate two types of adversaries:
– Type-1 Forger: an adversary that outputs a valid
m-ticket T ickk which cannot be linked to a regis-
tered user (corrupted or not).
– Type-2 Forger: an adversary that outputs more
valid m-tickets than he obtained.
We show that both Forgers can be used to solve the
q-SDH-I problem. However, the reduction works differ-
ently for each Forger type. Therefore, initially B chooses
a random bit cmode ∈ 1, 2 that indicates its guess for the
type of forgery that B will output.
If cmode = 1: Eventually, B outputs, with
non-negligible probability, a valid m-ticket T ickk′ =
(Bk′ , E′,Π′) such that the algorithm IdentUser, on the
input T ickk′ , returns an unknown identifier ID (i.e.,
does not appear in DBREG).
First case: c = gs
′
1 (the plaintext encrypted in E′)
has been queried during an OTokenRequestT request
but no corresponding signature µ has been produced.
This means that the adversary did not receive the value
s2 (where s′ = s′1 + s2) from the OTokenRequestT or-
acle. We know from the Forking Lemma and the proofs
Π and Π1 that A necessarily knows s′ and s2. Since
only gs21 has been revealed by this oracle during the
OTokenRequestT , A could be used to extract Discrete
Logarithms. Therefore under the DL assumption, this
first case could only occur with negligible probability.
Second case: E′ is an encryption of a commitment
c = gs
′
1 of a value s′ that has not been queried during a
OTokenRequestT request. Therefore s′ has not been
queried to the BB-signature oracle either. Using the
Forking Lemma and the soundness property of the proof
Π1, B is able to extract with non-negligible probabil-
ity the secrets (a′, s′, r′, A′, k′) underlying the m-ticket
T ickk′ . B outputs the triplet (r′, s′, A′) to its challenger
of the q-SDH-I assumption and therefore breaks it.
If cmode = 2: Eventually, A outputs, with non-
negligible probability ξ, L = N ×maxticket + 1 valid m-
tickets 5 {T ickjkj}
j=L
j=1 , whereN is the number of calls to
the OTokenRequestT oracle,maxticket is the number of
authorized m-tickets by token and T ickjkj = (Bkj , E,Π).
Let us denote by (s1, s2, ..., sN ) the N token secrets
submitted to the BB-signature oracle. W.l.o.g, we may
assume that all these values are different (recall that
a token secret s is jointly computed by A and B). We
therefore have N ×maxticket distinct token pairs (si, k)
with i ∈ {1, ... , N} and k ∈ {1, ... ,maxticket}. Let Γ be
the set containing all these token pairs and T ickij the
m-ticket corresponding to the token pair (si, j).
Among the L m-tickets output by A, there is at
least one m-ticket T ickk∗ for which the corresponding
token pair (s∗, k∗) does not belong to Γ. Otherwise
this would mean that two m-tickets among these L m-
5 Without loss of generality, we do not make any distinction be-
tween a m-ticket and an unused m-ticket
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tickets, e.g., T ickk1 and T ickk2 , have the same token
pair (since L > N × maxticket). Let us denote by (s∗1,
k1) (respectively (s∗2, k2)) the token pair correspond-
ing to T ickk1 (respectively T ickk2). Therefore the se-
rial number B∗k1 of T ickk1 would be equal to B
∗
k2 the
one of T ickk2 : B∗k1= g
1/(s∗1+k1+1)
t = g
1/(s∗2+k2+1)
t = B∗k2 .
This case cannot occur since all duplicates (i.e. m-tickets
which have the same serial numbers) are discarded in
the experiment ExpunforgA (1
λ).
Suppose now that s∗ ∈ {s1, s2, ... , sN}. Since
(s∗, k∗) /∈ Γ this implies that k∗ /∈ {1, ... ,maxticket}.
Such a case will happen with negligible probability un-
der the q-SDH assumption (see Theorem 2). There-
fore s∗ /∈ {s1, s2, ... , sN} and consequently has not
been queried to the BB-signature oracle (A is in fact a
Type-1 Forger). B then picks a random m-ticket T ickk′
among the L m-tickets output by A. With probability
1/L, it has chosen T ickk∗. Using the Forking Lemma
and the soundness property of the proof Π, B is able
to extract with non-negligible probability the secrets
(a′, s′, r′, A′, k′) underlying the m-ticket T ickk′ . B out-
puts the triplet (r′, s′, A′) and therefore breaks the q-
SDH-I assumption with non-negligible probability ξ/L.
To complete the proof, we need to clarify why we
discard duplicates in ExpunforgA (1
λ). We consider that
T ickk = (Bk, E,Π) and T ickk′ = (Bk′ , E′,Π′) are dupli-
cates if their serial numbers are equal. Let us denote by
(s, k) (respectively (s′, k′)) the token pair correspond-
ing to the ticket T ickk (respectively T ickk′). Since Bk
= Bk′ , we have s+ k = s′ + k′ mod p.
First case: (s, k) = (s′, k′): This implies that T ickk
and T ickk′ are in fact the same tickets. We can therefore
discard one of them.
Second case: (s, k) 6= (s′, k′):
Case 2.1 : s or s′ /∈ {s1, s2, ... , sN}. This implies that
A is a Type-1 Forger. Under the q-SDH-I assumption,
this case will occur with negligible probability.
Case 2.2 : s and s′ ∈ {s1, s2, ... , sN}. This implies
that k and k′ ∈ {1, ... ,maxticket}. Otherwise A could be
used to break the q-SDH assumption (see the proof of
Theorem 2). Since s and s′ have been randomly chosen
(they are jointly computed by A and B), the probability
that s+ k = s′ + k′ mod p is negligible. Therefore Case
2.2. will occur with negligible probability either.
Consequently, under the q-SDH assumption, only
the first case could occur and we only discard tickets
that come from the same token secret.
E.4 Proof of unlinkability
Sketch of proof. We prove the unlinkability under
a slightly weaker model than the one presented in Sec-
tion 4.3.3. Indeed, we consider a slightly different ex-
periment in which the adversary cannot query the re-
vocation oracle OIdentUserT . We rename this new re-
quirement Unlinkability*. We would like however to
emphasize that the access to revocation functionalities
will likely be carefully controlled in a real deployment
of an m-ticketing system. Therefore, unlinkability* is a
reasonable model to consider.
Anyway, in order to satisfy the original unlinkabil-
ity requirement, we just need to replace the ElGamal
encryption scheme, which only satisfies IND-CPA se-
curity, by an IND-CCA2 encryption scheme. It is well-
known that by double encrypting the same message un-
der an IND-CPA scheme and using a simulation sound
proof of equality of plaintexts, we obtain an IND-CCA2
scheme. Therefore, by using the double ElGamal en-
cryption scheme, which was proved IND-CCA2 in [53],
our m-ticketing protocol would satisfy the original un-
linkability requirement.
Let A be an adversary who breaks the unlinkabil-
ity requirement of our m-ticketing protocol. W.l.o.g. we
will consider that a query to the OReportT icket ora-
cle on (IDU , view) for the report of j unused m-tickets
is equivalent to j queries to the OGenTicket on (IDU ,
view).
Let m = maxticket. We will say that an adversary
A against our unlinkability experiment Expunlink−bA (1λ)
is a Type-(i, j) distinguisher, with i ≤ m − 1 and
j ≤ m − 1, if A after having received its challenge
(from its Expunlink−bA (1
λ)-challenger) makes at most i
queries to the OGenTicket oracle on (i0, view0) and
j queries to the OGenTicket oracle on (i1, view1).
We can remark that a Type-(i, j) distinguisher, with
i ≤ m − 1 and j ≤ m − 1, is also a Type-(m − 1,
m − 1) distinguisher. We may therefore, without loss
of generality, restrict our attention to Type-(m − 1,
m − 1) distinguishers. In the sequel, we will thus as-
sume that A is such an adversary. More precisely, we
will suppose that after receiving T ickkb and T ickk1−b ,
A arbitrarily queries the ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU ,
OCorruptUser, OIdentT icketT and OTokenRequestU
oracles and then queries the OReportT icket oracle on
(i0, view0) and (i1, view1).
We give a security proof as a sequence of games,
using Shoup’s methodology [55]. We will only give a
rather high-level description of the initial game (Game
A Practical Set-Membership Proof for Privacy-Preserving NFC Mobile Ticketing 24
0) and brief descriptions of the modifications between
successive games.
Game 0: This is the original attack game with re-
spect to a given efficient adversary A.
The challenger C randomly chooses g, g0, g1, gt, gT ,
gU , h, G, H nine generators of G1 and g2, g3 two gen-
erators of G2. It also chooses the keys for the Paillier
encryption scheme as well as the ones for the transport
authority and revocation authorities. C sends gpk and
tsk to A. C answers to A’s requests as follows:
– ORegisterHU requests: C randomly chooses xU ∈
Zp and computes hU = gxUU .
– ORegisterMU requests: C does not need to do any-
thing.
– OCorruptUser requests: C gives xU to A.
– OTokenRequestU requests: C chooses a random
value s1 to obtain a valid permission token (A, r, s)
and uses xU to generate the signature µ.
– OGenTicket(IDU , view) requests: C uses its permis-
sion token (A, r, s) and a fresh index k that has
not been used in a previous query of OGenTicket
on IDU and view and computes a ticket T ickk =
(Bk, E,Π).
– OIdentT icketT (IDU , view) requests: C computes
the m-tickets T ickk based on the secret s corre-
sponding to the user identifier IDU and gives them
to A.
– OReportT icket(IDU , view) requests: C proceeds as
in a OGenTicket request for each unused m-ticket.
The adversary chooses two honest users i0 and i1
and two indexes k0 and k1. C runs the protocol
TokenRequest with i0 and i1 and outputs the corre-
sponding views, view0 and view1, to A. It then gen-
erates two valid m-tickets: T ickkb = (Bkb , Eb,Πb) for
i0 and T ickk1−b = (Bk1−b , E1−b,Π1−b) for i1 and send
them to A. The goal of A is to guess the value of
b. After having received its challenge, A can queries
the ORegisterHU , ORegisterMU , OCorruptUser,
OTokenRequestU , OGenTicket, OIdentT icketT and
OReportT icket oracles but with the following restric-
tions: it cannot query the OCorruptUser oracle on i0
or i1 or the OIdentT icketT oracle on (i0, view0) or (i1,
view1) and cannot query the OReport T icket oracle on
(i0, view0) or (i1, view1) if both users did not validate
the same number of m-tickets (otherwise it can easily
win this game).
At the end of the game, the adversary outputs
a bit b′, its guess. Let S0 be the event that b =
b′ in this game and Si the event that b = b′ in
game i. We have: |Pr[S0] − 1/2| = Advunlink−bA (1λ) =
|Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ) = b]− 1/2|
Let {T ickiki
b
= (Biki
b
, Eiki
b
,Πiki
b
)}i=m−1i=1 denote the
m − 1 unused (reported) m-tickets of i0 and {T ickiki1−b
= (Biki1−b , E
i
ki1−b
, Πiki1−b)}
i=m−1
i=1 the ones of i1, where the
kib’s and the ki1−b’s belongs to {1, ... ,m}.
– Game(0,b): This is the same game as Game 0
except that we replace the El Gamal ciphertext Eb
by an encryption of a random value and then simu-
late the proof Πb. Such a simulated proof can easily
be done in the random oracle model using standard
techniques. Under the DDH assumption, A cannot
detect this change. Indeed, we can easily construct
a DDH distinguisher D with DDH-advantage satis-
fying:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S(0,b)]| ≤ AdvDDHD (1λ) (1)
where AdvDDHD (1λ) is the DDH-advantage of D
in solving the DDH problem. In the sequel, we
will use the simplified notation AdvDDH (respec-
tively Advq−DDHI) to denote the DDH-advantage
(respectively the q-DDHI advantage) of some effi-
cient algorithm in solving the DDH (respectively q-
DDHI) problem.
– Game(0,1-b): This is the same game as
Game(0,b) except that we replace the El Gamal
ciphertext E1−b by an encryption of a random value
and then simulate the proof Π1−b. Such a simulated
proof can easily be done in the random oracle model
using standard techniques. Under the DDH assump-
tion, A cannot detect this change. Indeed, we can
easily construct a DDH distinguisher D with DDH-
advantage satisfying:
|Pr[S(0,b)]− Pr[S(0,1−b)]| ≤ AdvDDH (2)
– Game(0,0,b): This is the same game as
Game(0,1-b) except that we replace the serial
number Bkb by a random value and then simulate
the proof Πb. Such a simulated proof can easily
be done in the random oracle model using stan-
dard techniques. Under the q-DDHI assumption,
A cannot detect this change. Indeed, we can easily
construct a q-DDHI distinguisher D with q DDHI-
advantage satisfying:
|Pr[S(0,1−b)]− Pr[S(0,0,b)]| ≤ Advq−DDHI (3)
– Game(0,0,1-b): This is the same game as
Game(0,0,b) except that we replace the serial
number Bk1−b by a random value and then sim-
ulate the proof Π1−b. Such a simulated proof can
easily be done in the random oracle model using
standard techniques. Under the q-DDHI assump-
tion, A cannot detect this change. Indeed, we can
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easily construct a q-DDHI distinguisher D with q
DDHI-advantage satisfying:
|Pr[S(0,0,b)]− Pr[S(0,0,1−b)]| ≤ Advq−DDHI (4)
Let Game 1 be the same game as Game(0,0,1-b)
Combining (1), (2), (3) and (4), we obtain:
|Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ 2AdvDDH + 2Advq−DDHI
We then proceed similarly for each unused m-ticket
of i0 and i1: {T ickiki
b
= (Biki
b
, Eiki
b
,Πiki
b
)}i=m−1i=1 and
{T ickiki1−b = (B
i
ki1−b
, Eiki1−b , Π
i
ki1−b
)}i=m−1i=1 . For i = 1
to m− 1, we define the following game.
– Game(i,b): This is the same game as Game i
= Game(i-1,0,1-b) except that we replace the El
Gamal ciphertext Eib by an encryption of a random
value and then simulate the proof Πib.
– Game(i,1-b): This is the same game as
Game(i,b) except that we replace the El Gamal
ciphertext Ei1−b by an encryption of a random value
and then simulate the proof Πi1−b.
– Game(i,0,b): This is the same game asGame(i,1-
b) except that we replace the serial number Biki
b
by
a random value and then simulate the proof Πib.
– Game(i,0,1-b): This is the same game as Game
i,0,b) except that we replace the serial number
Biki1−b
by a random value and then simulate the
proof Πi1−b.
Let Game i + 1 be the same game as Game(i,0,1-b).
We obtain as above: |Pr[Si+1]−Pr[Si]| ≤ 2AdvDDH +
2Advq−DDHI
Using our notation, Game m is the same
game as Game(m-1,0,1-b). In the latter game, the
unlinkability-challenger gives no information (in a
strong information theoretic sense) to A about the bit b
(since all the El Gamal ciphertexts have been replaced
by encryptions of random values and all serial numbers
have been replaced by random values). Therefore we
have: Pr[Sm] = 1/2.
We can now give an upper bound for
Advunlink−bA (1
λ) :
Advunlink−bA (1
λ) = |Pr[Expunlink−bA (1λ) = b]−1/2|
= |Pr[S0]− Pr[Sm]|
We have:
|Pr[S0] − Pr[Sm]| ≤ Σj=m−1j=0 |Pr[Sj ] − Pr[Sj+1]| ≤
2m× (AdvDDH + Advq−DDHI)
Therefore under the DDH and q-DDHI assump-
tions, the advantage Advunlink−bA (1
λ) of a Type-(m−1,
m− 1) distinguisher is negligible (and consequently the
one of a Type-(i, j) distinguisher, with i ≤ m − 1 and
j ≤ m− 1, is also negligible).
We can then conclude that our proposed m-ticketing
protocol satisfies the unlinkability* requirement, in the
random oracle model, under the DDH and q-DDHI as-
sumptions.
